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Abstract: Innovations in image capture technology create 
new versions of long-standing concerns about privacy, with 
the debate over unmanned aerial vehicles, known in the 
popular media as drones, as the latest example. The history 
of privacy claims in image capture technology weaves 
together arguments about technically-oriented harms and 
arguments about human dignity. Claims for defending 
privacy against intrusions from cameras, camera phones, 
and thermal imaging can be deployed in new forms in 
defenses of privacy against drones. This article ends with a 
caution about unintended consequences of regulating 
privacy, and of attempting to avoid regulation altogether.   
Technological innovation has a fraught relationship with privacy, 
with the most pessimistic observers assuming that the sufficient 
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advance of the former inexorably leads to the destruction of the latter.1 
Even the most ardent believer in the power of privacy rights 
recognizes trade-offs between privacy and new technology: online 
shopping offers tremendous convenience at the cost of the shopper’s 
personal data; the National Security Agency collects phone records to 
protect Americans’ interests, creating an unprecedented store of 
information about citizens’ activities. Furthermore, the increasingly 
sophisticated biometrics protecting sensitive data create their own 
stores of highly personal information.2 
Drones, or unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as they are known in 
the industry, are at the leading edge of the privacy debate, with 
industry working with the American Civil Liberties Union or more 
specialized groups such as the Stop LAPD Spying Coalition to develop 
regulations intended to further technological development and make 
people’s lives better, not worse.3 Privacy-oriented technology groups, 
such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center, have also taken the 
fight to government agencies, petitioning to initiate rulemaking “to 
address the threat to privacy and civil liberties that will result from the 
deployment of aerial drones within the United States.”4 The Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) predicts there could be 15,000 civilian 
drones operating in U.S. airspace by 2020, though this will depend 
 
 
 
 
* The authors would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewer for comments, as 
well as Craig Woolsey and two Virginia Tech institutes, the Institute for Critical 
Technologies and Applied Science, and the Institute for Society, Culture, and Environment.  
1 Charles Nesson, Threats to Privacy, 68 SOC. RES. 105, 105 (2001).  
2 See generally Ann Cavoukian, Michelle Chibba & Alex Stoianov, Advances in Biometric 
Encryption: Taking Privacy by Design from Academic Research to Deployment, 29 REV. 
OF POL’Y RES. 37 (2012). 
3 See generally Robert Heverly, The State of Drones: State Authority to Regulate Drones, 
8 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 29 (2015). A drone is an unmanned aerial vehicle with autonomous 
flight capabilities. A remote-piloted aircraft is not necessarily a drone. This is an important 
ethical and technological distinction, as manually remotely piloted aircraft are under 
human control, whereas fully autonomous drones may carry out their mission according to 
a predetermined algorithm. 
4 Petition from the Electronic Privacy Information Center to Michael P Huerta, Acting 
Adm’r, U.S. Fed. Aviation Admin. (Feb. 24, 2012), https://epic.org/privacy/drones/FAA-
553e-Petition-03-08-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PBU-WYLU].  
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both on whether government adopts UAS-friendly regulations and, 
ultimately, on a skeptical public’s acceptance of the technology.5 
Drone technology is poised to proliferate, and policy can influence 
technological innovation to only a limited extent. After Pandora’s box 
is opened, it is too late. One of the few tools that policymakers have at 
their disposal in this regard is a robust, coherent, and precisely 
defined concept of privacy.6 The history of image capture technology 
shows that privacy norms can be used to shape how technology 
develops and what protections should accompany new technology. In 
fact, some scholars argue the privacy issues raised by the proliferation 
of drones may bring needed updates to how society approaches 
privacy and its legal protection with regards to other technologies.7  
Drone technology is a contemporary phenomenon, but concern 
about the use and proliferation of image capture technology is not. 
This article situates the case of drones in the historical context of 
image capture technology in order to illuminate the tensions between 
technological development and privacy, and between different 
conceptions of privacy. There are two overlapping traditions and ways 
of arguing that provide resources for addressing claims about privacy 
rights in image capture technology, specifically cameras, camera 
phones, advanced imaging technologies, and drones. The first 
tradition views privacy in a more technical sense as the sum of 
thousands of specific precedents on particular legal issues, no 
different than many other mundane disputes. The second tradition 
makes claims for privacy as a broad-based right rooted in the lofty 
notion of human dignity. The first tradition relies on rules and 
regulations, while the second appeals more often to principled notions 
of what is good for human flourishing.8 
Technical approaches to regulating privacy have proven useful 
because analogies can be made to earlier technologies. Scholars claim 
that existing torts provide tools for resolving many disputes over 
 
 
 
 
5 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AEROSPACE FORECAST FISCAL YEARS 2010-2030 (2010), 
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/2010-
2030/media/2010%20Forecast%20Doc.pdf [https://perma.cc/EGE4-24T9].  
6 See generally Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 (2002).  
7 M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 29 (2011). 
8 Terry L. Cooper, Hierarchy, Virtue, and the Practice of Public Administration: A 
Perspective for Normative Ethics, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 320 (1987); Lewis C. Mainzer, 
Vulgar Ethics for Public Administration, 23 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 3 (1991). 
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privacy and drones, but that existing torts must be adapted to 
prevailing norms.9 The norms, however, are often articulated in terms 
of respect for human dignity, privacy, and personal property – claims 
to principles rather than just technical protections. At a deeper level, 
technical approaches depend on normative ideals.   
The utility of dignity-based approaches has been limited when 
their arguments veer too far in the direction of first principles. 
Interest groups and legislators can appeal to an absolute right to 
privacy and control of one’s surroundings, but the courts operate 
through addressing harms. Calo has argued that the lack of a mental 
model for privacy harm limits the appeal of privacy claims in the 
courts and public debates because there is no paradigmatic story 
about what constitutes a privacy violation when it comes to drones.10 
Advocates for limits on the privacy harms that drones may cause lack 
their September 11 or Hurricane Katrina, even as drone technology 
ignites visceral fear.11  
This article shows how both dignity-based and technical 
approaches are woven throughout the history of image capture 
technology. Arguments about defending privacy against intrusions 
from cameras, camera phones, and thermal imaging can be deployed 
in defenses of privacy in the case of drones. The article ends with a 
caution about the unintended consequences of overregulating privacy 
or avoiding regulation altogether.  
 
 
 
 
9 Benjamin Mathews, Potential Tort Liability for Personal Use of Drone Aircraft, 46 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 573 (2015). 
10 Calo, supra note 7. 
11 Drone technology may have some of the character of what psychologists call a “dread 
risk” since there is a perceived lack of control, the fear of catastrophic and fatal 
consequences, and inequitable risks and benefits. The public (as opposed to experts) tends 
to look past cost/benefit data and favor regulation of dread risks more than it does with 
other kinds of risks. See Baruch Fischhoff, Stephen Watson & Chris Hope, Defining Risk, 
17 POL’Y SCI. 123, 129 (1984); Gerd Gigerenzer, Dread Risk, September 11, and Fatal 
Traffic Accidents, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 286, 286 (2004); Paul Slovic & Ellen Peters, Risk 
Perception and Affect, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 322, 322-23 (2006). 
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I. TWO TRADITIONS OF PRIVACY CLAIMS 
A. Dignity-Based Privacy Arguments 
Though it reflects a general claim about what is owed to fellow 
human beings, the dignity-centric conception of privacy grew out of 
specific grievances. American law’s foundational work on privacy, 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ The Right to Privacy, was written 
partially in response to the emerging technology of its day: personal 
photography.12 Warren and Brandeis had become alarmed by the 
threats to privacy posed by the combination of camera technology and 
yellow journalism.13 In response, the jurists examined existing legal 
precedent and found an underlying understanding that privacy is an 
inherent human right. Their argument identifies a common thread of 
privacy protection in the legal precedents established by slander and 
libel, intellectual property rights, violation of trust and contract, and 
trade secret law. Warren and Brandeis explained that in each of these 
areas there were obvious gaps that had been bridged by an 
understanding that people possess not just a desire for privacy, but a 
legal expectation of it.14 
As an article and not a legal judgment, The Right to Privacy could 
not confer legal authority upon Warren and Brandeis’ views. However, 
the ideas set forth in the essay would find traction in court cases 
across the country, slowly building its own legal precedent.15 After 
Brandeis assumed a seat on the Supreme Court in 1916, his judicial 
philosophy carried even greater weight. Though written in dissent, 
Brandeis’ opinion in Olmstead v. United States16 was the foundation 
for much of the right to privacy doctrine that followed. The 
government argued in Olmstead that the Fourth Amendment only 
protected Americans from physical intrusions, meaning that the 
wiretap conducted without a warrant against Olmstead was legal. 
 
 
 
 
12 See generally Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890). 
13 See generally Neil Richards & Daniel Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 
98 CAL. L. REV. 1887 (2010). 
14 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12.  
15 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 386 (1960). 
16 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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While the majority found in favor of the government and the legality 
of the “warrantless wiretap,” Brandeis argued that the search was 
illegal. He wrote that since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, “Subtler 
and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become 
available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it 
possible for the Government, by means far more effective than 
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is 
whispered in the closet.”17 Brandeis argued that technology would 
increase the government’s ability to intrude in the lives of citizens, and 
that the Constitution was surely able to protect its citizens from such 
seeming eventualities. “Can it be that the Constitution affords no 
protection against such invasions of individual security?”18 
Though most famously espoused by Warren and Brandeis, dignity-
based arguments about privacy became part of a rich tradition in the 
law. Edward Bloustein, a prominent legal scholar in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, was an outspoken believer in Warren and Brandeis’ 
conception, equating violations of privacy to physical assaults on one’s 
person.19 Frequently sparring with those in favor of privacy in the 
tradition we describe as “technical,” he argued that the public’s 
concern in protecting privacy, both generally and in the case of 
emerging electronic monitoring, was through the “preservation of the 
individual’s dignity.”20 Others would follow, emphasizing privacy’s 
fundamental moral dimensions, rooted in natural law and equal 
respect within a shared community.21 While some scholars argue that 
dignity-based privacy is a vague mishmash of legal theories, most 
scholars of the dignity-based tradition maintain the opposite 
viewpoint: that dignity-based privacy is a coherent-if difficult and 
multifaceted-concept rooted in the belief that individuals have a right 
to control their external exposure and limit others’ access to their 
 
 
 
 
17 Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
18 Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
19 Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1002 (1964).  
20 Id. at 1007.  
21 Robert Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 
41 CASE W. L. REV. 647, 651 (1964); see generally Lisa Nelson, Privacy and Technology: 
Reconsidering a Crucial Public Policy Debate in the Post September 11 Era, 64 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 259 (2004).  
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personal information.22 Loss of control over one’s personal 
information results in a loss of the individuality necessary for the 
establishment of one’s very personhood.23  
This conception of privacy is not a universally accepted notion. 
Many scholars note that such an understanding of privacy has an 
important cultural component that can impact societal expectations of 
what such a right entails.24 If what dignity requires is not universal, 
the argument goes, then why rely on it as a foundation for privacy 
claims? Demonstrable harms rather than appeals to dignity make for a 
better case for protections, according to these critics. Furthermore, 
the lack of specificity contained in a broad dignity-based conception of 
privacy could lead to gaps in privacy protection or confusion when 
privacy intersects with other rights, such as freedom of expression. 
For these reasons, many practicing lawyers have framed their privacy 
claims in a more technical and specific manner, drawing on precedent 
and rulings about other technologies.  
B. Technical Privacy Arguments 
Much as Warren and Brandeis were the first to strongly and 
clearly articulate a right to privacy that incorporates a notion of 
human dignity, William Prosser was the most successful (if not first) 
advocate for a conception of privacy based less on philosophical and 
ethical grounds than on widely accepted legal concepts such as 
property rights and protection against slander. Prosser was the author 
of an influential article, titled simply Privacy, in which he examined 
the case law that had emerged since Warren and Brandeis’ article was 
 
 
 
 
22 See generally Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); 
Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34 (1967); Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
23 Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 371, 378 (2003). 
24 See generally Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977); 
Christopher Slogobin & Joseph Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and 
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at Understandings 
Recognized and Permitted by Society, 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993); Shaun Spencer, 
Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843 (2002); 
Hank Jenkins-Smith & Kerry Herron, Rock and a Hard Place: Public Willingness to Trade 
Civil Rights and Liberties for Greater Security, 37 POL. & POL’Y 1095 (2009); John 
Gardner, The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person, 131 L. Q. REV. 563 (2015); Nelson, 
supra note 21.  
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published 70 years earlier. Whereas Warren and Brandeis and the 
scholars who followed them saw legal precedent a common thread 
based on respect for human dignity, Prosser saw a hodgepodge of legal 
concepts that fell into four baskets: intrusion upon one’s seclusion, 
solitude, or personal business; public disclosure of private 
information; falsehood that leads to a negative public image; and use 
of a person’s name or likeness for gain without approval.25 Though the 
essay begins by paying homage to Warren and Brandeis, it can also be 
read as a refutation of the argument that privacy is rooted in natural 
rights.26 Warren and Brandeis also referenced torts, but they argued 
that there is an underlying normative principle of privacy. In contrast, 
Prosser understood privacy rights as a collection of legal doctrines 
that are “tied together by the common name,” but “otherwise have 
almost nothing in common”.27 This formed the basis of the technical 
conception of privacy. 
Prosser’s conception of privacy in the Restatement of Torts, 
Second influenced a generation of lawyers. His work became the 
source of legal authority for a technical conception of privacy, which 
his supporters have credited with organizing and legitimizing privacy 
as a legal concept, specifically negative-defined privacy, which defines 
privacy not in terms of what it is, but of what is not.28 The technical 
approach, which is similar to what other authors have conceived of as 
“formal”29 or “thin”30 conceptions of legal understanding, offers an 
undeniable convenience: as objectionable actions take place, the 
injured parties can take civil action against their injurers. The actions 
or misdeeds in question can be linked to a specific type of legally 
validated injury and judged against similar case law, a process that 
seems to offer more concrete and actionable legal grounding than the 
 
 
 
 
25 Prosser, supra note 15, at 389. 
26 Bloustein, supra note 19, at 965.  
27 Prosser, supra note 15, at 389. 
28 Richards & Solove, supra note 13, at 1889.  
29 Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework, PUB. L. 467 (1997). 
30 Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Magna Carta, the Rule of Law, and the Limits of 
Government (U. of Pa., Working Paper No. 15-035, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2676184 [https://perma.cc/QD43-
EX2A]. 
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more philosophical arguments of Warren and Brandeis’ strict 
adherents. This same dynamic makes Prosser’s negative conception 
popular among legislators and regulators. Rather than wrestle with 
questions of natural law or innate human rights, cases can be decided 
and laws or regulations can be put in place to remove the immediate 
threat to privacy caused by objectionable actions or practices. 
Though the technical conception of privacy as defined by Prosser 
is newer than Warren and Brandeis’ dignity-based conception, the 
tradition of examining privacy rights by how they fit into other legal 
traditions predates the latter model. As we will see later in this 
assessment, Warren and Brandeis’ argument was originally seen by 
some jurists as unworkable because it failed to fit such violations into 
existing tort structures.31 Later scholars would examine the work of 
Warren and Brandeis or Bloustein and conclude that dignity simply 
did not offer enough specificity to serve as the foundation of privacy 
law.32 Both technical and dignity-based scholars came to define 
themselves in part by their reaction to the other tradition.  
Though they became distinct schools of thought, the legal tools of 
both traditions overlap. Tort law is central to the Prosserian technical 
understanding of privacy, and Warren and Brandeis based their 
argument on existing, widely-accepted tort principles. Later 
champions of dignity-based privacy held torts as a central remedy to 
privacy violations.33 In the Warren and Brandeis approach, torts are 
the vehicle for determining, in a context specific to the individual and 
the privacy violation, whether a specific incident violates the dignity-
based conception of human rights.34 This stands in contrast to the 
“technical” tradition, which sees torts not as a means of testing privacy 
violations but as the real force behind the legal concept of privacy. 
It views dignity-based conceptions with skepticism, having the 
baggage of natural law, absolutism, and mysticism. In reality, 
arguments from these two traditions are mixed in the history of 
debates over image-capture technology. 
 
 
 
 
31 Irwin Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 
CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 716 (1989). 
32 Gavison, supra note 22, at 438. 
33 See generally Edward Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren 
and Brandeis’ Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 Tex. L. Rev. 611 (1968). 
34 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 215; id. at 615. 
474 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 13:2 
 
 
 
Characteristics of Privacy 
Dignity-Based Privacy Looks for meaning behind 
case law 
Flexible 
Not necessarily tied to 
specific legal provisions 
Violations tied to violation 
of personhood 
Technically-Oriented 
Privacy Specifically prohibits the most egregious behaviors 
Seeks to fit privacy inside 
other tort traditions 
Privacy as a legal right, not a 
moral one 
II. PRIVACY CONCERNS AND IMAGE CAPTURE TECHNOLOGY 
Both dignity-based and technically-oriented conceptions of 
privacy have virtues, but their differences become important as the 
competing conceptions are applied to new and emerging technology 
such as drones. Where data sources can be used to create a mosaic of 
personal information,35 such considerations take on new urgency. To 
better explore the impact of these differing privacy traditions on the 
debate over UAS, we examine key junctures in the history of image 
capture technology and consider the strengths and weaknesses of each 
conception. The two traditions do not lead into a distinct Goldilocks-
style third way between the porridge that is too hot and the porridge 
that is too cold. Rather, the history of image capture technology shows 
that arguments from both traditions can be employed for specific 
purposes – technical approaches to identify analogies for harms from 
earlier technology, and dignity-based approaches to appeal to the 
visceral reaction that many people have to defend human autonomy 
against drone spying.  
 
 
 
 
35 See generally Anne Washington, Government Information Policy in the Era of Big 
Data, 31 REV. OF POL’Y RES. 319 (2014). 
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A. Cameras 
When daguerreotypes first emerged in the mid-19th century, the 
widespread proliferation of photography was limited by its costly, 
cumbersome, and temperamental nature. Early cameras required 
their subjects to remain still for the duration of a lengthy chemical 
process, limiting their utility. Even as camera technology improved, 
the cost limited it to the realm of professionals and the wealthy. This 
changed dramatically with the advent of the photographic process. 
Personal cameras democratized image capture, affording everyday 
citizens the ability to take pictures of the world around them. 
However, while this technology created new possibilities for many, for 
others it was the beginning of a frightening new affront to privacy. 
Beginning with the press’ fascination with the lives of the wealthy and 
influential, this technology came to form the backdrop against which 
Warren and Brandeis’ treatise was born. “Instantaneous photographs 
and newspaper enterprises have invaded the sacred precincts of 
private and domestic life,” they proclaimed, “and numerous 
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that “what is 
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.”36 
The notion that people have an innate right to keep personal matters 
private reverberated among many who were concerned that 
technology such as the camera would continue to diminish any sense 
of privacy they once possessed. 
Though the idea of a right to privacy gained some public acclaim, 
the legal precedent that emerged contradicted the assertions of 
Warren and Brandeis. In 1902, the New York Court of Appeals ruled 
in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.37 that Roberson, who 
claimed to have suffered duress from the unauthorized use of her 
image by an advertising company for a flour company, was not 
entitled to collect damages based on a violation of her privacy. The 
Court viewed the idea that a person could have such control over his 
or her image as unworkable; it added that “the so-called ‘right of 
privacy’ has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence, 
and, as we view it, the doctrine cannot now be incorporated without 
doing violence to settled principles of law by which the profession and 
 
 
 
 
36 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 195. 
37 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (1902). 
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the public have long been guided.”38 Tremendous public outcry 
followed the ruling, prompting one of the judges on the appeals panel 
to issue an unprecedented public defense of the court’s ruling.39 
Spurred on by press scrutiny of the ruling, public pressure for a 
legislative fix mounted. The New York State Legislature eventually 
passed a law making it illegal to use a person’s likeness for profit or 
advertising without consent.40 
At the heart of Roberson was the question of one’s ownership over 
his or her own image, a concept central to the debate over 
photography and the right to privacy. While the Court’s ruling itself 
represented a step backward for the ideas espoused by Warren and 
Brandeis, the resulting legislative action demonstrated the power of 
their argument for a fundamental human right to privacy.41 
Paradoxically, the resulting law42 followed the technical model that 
later became identified with Prosser, carefully detailing what 
constituted a violation of privacy and providing avenues for recourse if 
necessary. The New York law would be at the heart of numerous 
lawsuits, eventually being confirmed as constitutional, and similar 
statutes were eventually enacted in state legislatures across the 
country.43 The right to control the use of one’s image with regards to 
its use for profitmaking is now generally referred to as the right to 
publicity and remains an issue addressed at the state rather than 
federal level. 
While Roberson dealt with the issue of one’s image for the purpose 
of profit, other questions about limits of privacy arose over time. Over 
half a century later after the legal concept of a right to privacy had 
 
 
 
 
38 Id. 
39 Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the 
Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 641 (2002); Denis O’Brien, Right of Privacy, 2 
COLUM. L. REV. 437, 438 (1902) (Much as Brandeis and Warren had laid out their 
conception of the right to privacy in a law journal, Judge Denis O’Brien similarly turned to 
one for his defense of the ruling and condemnation of the “erroneous, not to say 
extravagant, version of the reasons upon which the decision rests and of the consequences 
to follow from it.”).  
40 Bratman, supra note 39.  
41 See id. 
42 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (1909). 
43 Prosser, supra note 15, at 385-86. 
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become widely accepted, Daily Times Democrat v. Graham44 raised 
questions as to how far the right extended and how it interacted with 
other rights. In Daily Times Democrat, a woman and her son were 
visiting a fair when a gust of wind lifted her skirt up in public view. A 
photographer took a picture of the unfortunate event, and a local 
publication printed it.45 Humiliated, the woman sued the newspaper, 
which claimed that not only did it have the right to print the picture 
under the first amendment, but the woman had no claim to privacy 
because the incident happened in a public setting.46 The Alabama 
Supreme Court sided with Graham, finding it absurd to claim that a 
person “forfeits her right of privacy merely because she happened at 
the moment to be part of a public scene.”47 
Daily Times Democrat marked a significant step forward for the 
concept of an affirmative right to privacy in the tradition of Warren 
and Brandeis.48 Whereas the courts had found in Roberson that no 
such right existed and had ruled, instead, in favor of “established 
principles of law,” Daily Times Democrat saw the right to privacy not 
only trump the freedom of the press, but expand to include public 
settings.49 It is particularly on this second issue that privacy as a right 
based in human dignity proved to be decisive. The lawyers for the 
newspaper employed a narrow, technical argument in defending the 
publication of Graham’s picture. However, the Alabama Supreme 
Court ruled against such a limited protection of privacy, finding 
privacy to extend beyond one’s location to one’s dignity as a human 
being. 
Questions regarding cameras and their impact on privacy did not 
end with Daily Times Democrat. As camera technology has continued 
to evolve, the concerns first laid out by Warren and Brandeis have 
 
 
 
 
44 See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964). 
45 Id. at 476. 
46 Id. at 478. 
47 Id. 
48 Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging 
Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL U. L. REV. 479, 
490 (1989-1990). 
49 Joseph Elford, Trafficking in Stolen Information: A “Hierarchy of Rights” Approach to 
the Private Facts Tort, 105 YALE L.J. 727, 754 (1995-1996). 
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gained new prominence. The rise of security cameras and closed 
circuit televisions drew concerns that privacy was doomed to 
disappear as an inevitable casualty of modernization.50 Similar 
predictions were made with the introduction of digital cameras, which 
combine the potential privacy threat of cameras with the ability to 
quickly and easily share images online.51 However, another technology 
would truly test the limits of privacy protections because of its 
ubiquity and technological convergence: the camera phone. 
B. Camera Phones 
In 2002, camera phones became widely available in the United 
States.52 At the time of the camera phone’s arrival, both cellular 
phones and cameras were widely used, but they existed as separate 
and distinct devices. This meant that, while cellular phones were often 
carried everyday by their users, cameras were not necessarily always 
at hand. Additionally, while dissemination of camera images had 
become easier with the introduction of digital cameras, such 
technology still required a user to connect the device to a computer in 
order to view and distribute the captured images. Camera phones 
offered their users the ability to take pictures on a device they already 
carried everywhere, making photography more convenient, and 
eventually the phones began to offer the ability to post pictures 
instantly to online platforms. By 2012, 85 percent of American adults 
owned a cell phone, and 82 percent of those owners used their phones 
to take pictures.53 Scholars describe the tendency of technology to 
evolve to perform similar tasks as “convergence.”54 The idea has 
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evolved into the “internet of things,” a vision where technologies are 
connected and perform overlapping tasks. If convergence is inevitable, 
then the history of camera phones is relevant for new technologies 
that will combine capabilities in the future.  
While the convenience of camera phones is hard to deny, the very 
capabilities that make them so helpful raise red flags with regards to 
personal privacy. These harken back to earlier concerns regarding 
cameras and the perceived degradation of the right to ownership over 
one’s image and identity. Adding to these fears is the multi-use nature 
of the devices, which increases the potential for a person to be 
recorded without their knowledge, particularly in public places.55 That 
these devices are also linked to the internet, allowing would-be 
photographers and chroniclers the ability to instantly publish their 
photos, creates, for some, a distinctive threat in need of novel 
protections.56 Building privacy protections for these devices on the 
muddled and often confusing case history of camera regulation 
creates even more difficulties.  
As scholars have noted, no technology operates in a lawless space, 
building instead on regulations and controversies of previously 
existing technologies.57 The shared legal lineage between cameras and 
camera phones is the source of two of the most fundamental questions 
at the heart of the tension between privacy and camera phone 
technology: is there an expectation of privacy in public, and where 
does personal privacy end and freedom of expression begin? These are 
not new questions—both were explicitly addressed in Daily Times 
Democrat and elsewhere—but the nature of the technology has caused 
these classic questions to evolve.58 Modern day instances of Daily 
Times Democrat have occurred across the country59, including at the 
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Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC in 2014. However, whereas the 
photographer in Daily Times Democrat took advantage of an 
unfortunate gust of wind, the man at the Lincoln Memorial took 
advantage of the innocuous appearance of his camera phone to take 
pictures up the clothes of women at the memorial. The District of 
Columbia District Court Judge threw out the voyeurism charges 
against the man, declaring that, though the man’s actions were 
“repellant and disturbing,” the women whom he had photographed 
had no expectation of privacy in such a public place.60 
Faced with a specific threat and mixed rulings from the judiciary, 
legislators have attempted to use technical limitations to either ban 
the practice of “upskirting” explicitly or include it under prohibitions 
as part of existing provisions of law. When faced with a ruling similar 
to the one described above, Massachusetts passed a law within two 
days that specifically banned the practice and provided a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy in not being so photographed.”61 Chicago had 
similar concerns in mind when it enacted a broad policy that banned 
the possession of camera phones in certain facilities, including 
bathrooms.62 While city leaders admitted the policy was virtually 
impossible to enforce, they felt it important to send the message that 
such behavior would not be tolerated. Congress has also made efforts 
to stem such behavior, introducing in 2009 the Camera Phone 
Predator Alert Act, which would have required camera phones to 
make a “shutter sound” when a picture was taken.63 Though the law 
did not pass, most manufacturers added the sound as a default 
setting, and a similar law is in place in Europe.64 
While laws and regulations specifically targeting the misuse of 
camera phones have been successful in some places in the United 
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States, policy makers in other areas have attempted to protect privacy 
through the use of existing legal provisions. In a number of cases, 
individuals have been prosecuted under wiretapping laws for 
recording others without their knowledge.65 In California, paparazzi 
laws have been used to try and provide some level of protection for 
everyday people.66 In cases in which the pictures have been posted 
online, authorities and plaintiffs have turned to anti-harassment laws 
for redress. While one could argue that, as Warren and Brandeis 
proposed, these cases illustrate a commonly understood universal 
right to privacy rooted in human dignity that undergirds these 
disparate policies, the lack of a unified approach seems to better 
support Prosser’s “hodgepodge” characterization, at least as an 
empirical description if not normative aim. 
Privacy advocates must also overcome the objections of advocates 
of other rights when rights claims are in conflict. The real battle for 
privacy protections may not be civil liberties groups versus industry, 
but privacy versus other rights. Champions of the right to freedom of 
expression and freedom of the press claim that the medley of legal 
concepts to defend freedoms of speech and expression is evidence of 
their supremacy over the nebulous concept of privacy.67 Should people 
be allowed to wear and share images from body cameras in any 
setting, for example? If privacy advocates are split between multiple 
approaches, their arguments can appear muddy and lose out to free 
speech claims. Prosserians have argued for policies that target specific 
undesired activities, such as the aforementioned anti-upskirting law in 
Massachusetts, while dignity-based privacy advocates have called for 
broad-based policies. In support of their arguments, promoters of a 
dignity-based conception of privacy point to Katz v. United States, 
which linked privacy rights to a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy, even in seemingly public places.68 The 2012 ruling in United 
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States v. Jones that warrantless electronic tracking of vehicles, even if 
the vehicles are clearly visible and using public roads, constitutes a 
violation of privacy seemed to confirm this interpretation, though this 
point is in dispute.69 Opinion polls show that the public prefers a 
broader, dignity-based conception of privacy, even as judicial rulings 
more often rely on the tort-based conception.70 
The courts have consistently, though not unanimously, used the 
technical model in assessing whether certain actions constitute a 
violation of specific statutes, rather than following the lead of the 
Alabama Supreme Court in taking a broader view of what privacy 
might entail. Similarly, while much of the rhetoric surrounding relief 
from camera phone intrusions has employed the logic of Warren and 
Brandeis, lawyers and lawmakers have sought legal protection and 
redress using technical conceptions involving narrowly crafted 
statutes and legal precedent.  
C. Advanced Imaging (Thermal Imaging) 
In a landmark case in 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
Department of Interior had violated the rights of Danny Lee Kyllo 
when an investigator used a thermal imager to monitor the heat being 
released from Kyllo’s house. Investigators had been watching the 
house because they believed Kyllo was growing marijuana in his 
home, an activity that creates large quantities of heat, which needs to 
be vented. The thermal imager provided investigators with enough 
evidence to obtain a warrant, and law enforcement officials confirmed 
their suspicions. However, in a 5-4 decision that crossed ideological 
lines, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this high tech investigative 
method was inherently intrusive when conducted without a warrant 
and constituted an illegal search and seizure of Kyllo’s property.71 
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Privacy advocates lauded the Court’s attempt to bring privacy 
protections into the information age. 
While the decision in Kyllo was groundbreaking in terms of 
applying technological limits to police investigations, it is neither the 
beginning nor the end of the story. In fact, the ruling in the case itself 
is complicated, raising questions of its own. Beyond the outcome of 
the ruling, the actual precedent and constitutional tests set forth in 
Kyllo were shaped by subsequent rulings in privacy and technology 
policy. 
The precedent set in Olmstead would stand until 1965, when the 
Supreme Court declared in Katz v. United States72 that a fourth 
amendment violation did not necessitate a physical intrusion. In Katz, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had placed a listening device 
outside of a telephone booth that Katz used to run his bookmaking 
business. The Court found that even though Katz was using a public 
facility, he had an expectation of privacy inside the telephone booth, 
making the government’s recording an unconstitutional search. “What 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.”73 This set up a two-pronged test 
for determining whether a violation of privacy has occurred: does the 
person have a reasonable expectation to privacy, and does society 
accept that expectation as reasonable? The standard established by 
Katz bore a stronger resemblance to dignity-based privacy protection 
than previous rulings, and it was derided by some as circular, 
subjective, and unpredictable.74 Still, it set the first limitation on law 
enforcement’s use of technology to gather evidence against and 
prosecute potential criminals. 
Katz would not be the last word on the issue of privacy and law 
enforcement powers. In 1983, the Supreme Court heard United States 
v. Place,75 a case in which a traveler, Raymond Place, drew the 
attention of law enforcement, who detained his luggage and subjected 
 
 
 
 
72 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
73 Id. at 351. 
74 Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the Partial Ascendance of Justice Scalia’s 
Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 1013, 1022 (2001). 
75 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
484 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 13:2 
 
 
it to a canine sniff test. The canine unit indicated the presence of 
narcotics, and a later search of the luggage revealed cocaine. The 
Supreme Court found that as the luggage had not been opened, the 
dog was only detecting what had seeped into public space. 
Additionally, because the canine unit’s training specifically for 
detecting narcotics, the search did not represent an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy.76 Similarly, in California v. Greenwood,77 the 
Laguna Beach Police Department brought drug charges against Billy 
Greenwood after searching his garbage. While lower courts had ruled 
in favor of Greenwood, the Supreme Court found that, since 
Greenwood had deposited his garbage on the curb for the express 
purpose of a third party removing it, he had no expectation of privacy 
and, therefore, was not the victim of a fourth amendment violation 
(Herdrich 1988, 995).  
California v. Ciraolo78 is particularly relevant for the emerging 
issue of domestic government drone surveillance. Dante Ciraolo’s 
backyard marijuana farm had attracted the attention of local law 
enforcement. The police could not see over Ciraolo’s tall fence, so they 
rented a private plane to fly at an altitude of 1,000 feet and look into 
the yard from above. The officers identified large marijuana plants 
and photographed them with a standard 35mm camera.79 While lower 
courts disagreed among themselves as to the legality of the police’s 
tactics, the Supreme Court found in favor of law enforcement. In his 
majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger argued that the police were 
flying at a height navigated by the public and that “any member of the 
public flying in this airspace who cared to glance down could have 
seen everything that the officers observed.”80 The court ruled Ciraolo’s 
expectation of privacy was not reasonable, and the police tactic 
legitimate.81 Legal scholars expect that this case will be an important 
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precedent in arguments for the legality of domestic drone 
surveillance.82  
By 2001’s Kyllo ruling, however, the Court expanded the 
boundaries of the individual’s expectation of privacy further. As 
previously mentioned, the case revolved around the warrantless use of 
a thermal imager to examine the heat being produced and vented 
from various areas of his house to determine if Danny Lee Kyllo was 
growing marijuana.83 The government argued that, like the case of 
narcotics particles in Place, the heat was being vented into public, 
thereby making the information no longer private. Additionally, the 
Court had previously ruled that police could use equipment to 
augment their senses, and that thermal imaging equipment was 
simply an extension of this principle. In Kyllo, the Court rejected both 
arguments. Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia argued 
that unlike the case of a drug sniffing dog that will only indicate the 
presence of narcotics, the thermal imaging equipment was not nearly 
as narrowly focused. Instead of indicating a marijuana growing 
operation, the technology could reveal any number of activities – even 
when a person liked to take baths.84 The technology granted 
investigators new senses rather than simply enhanced existing ones 
the way binoculars might. The potential expansiveness of the 
technology led to the Court’s tightening of the conditions under which 
the technology could be used. 
For many, the ruling in Kyllo was a triumph for privacy and 
protection of individual rights in the face of increasingly sophisticated 
government and law enforcement technology. However, there was 
also trepidation. While the case had shown that the Court was 
concerned with the effect of technological advancement on privacy, 
Scalia’s opinion also sought to ensure law enforcement was not at a 
technological disadvantage. The opinion referenced police use of 
advanced technology that is not in “general public use,” an important 
caveat designed to make sure that police are not forced to pursue 
 
 
 
 
82 Philip J. Hiltner, The Drones are Coming: Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for Police 
Surveillance and its Fourth Amendment Implications, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 397 
(2013); Chris Schlag, New Privacy Battle: How the Expanding Use of Drones Continues to 
Erode Our Concept of Privacy and Privacy Rights, 13 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2012); 
Timothy T. Takahashi, Drones and privacy, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 72, 72-114 
(2012).  
83 Seamon, supra note 74, at 1016. 
84 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001). 
486 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 13:2 
 
 
criminals with increasingly outdated tools. While attempting to add 
flexibility to the ruling, the majority introduced practical legal 
questions as well as normative ones.85 
While the practical issues raised in the Kyllo dissent are troubling 
from a legal process standpoint, the primary normative concern about 
what privacy should require is of even greater concern. Even though 
Justice John Paul Stephens disagreed with the finding in Kyllo, one of 
the criticisms in his dissent alludes to the problem left in the 
decision’s wake. Even if one were to ignore the lack of clarity in the 
“general public use” provision, “this criterion is somewhat perverse 
because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than 
recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily 
available.”86 While ensconced in a legal argument, the concept 
Stephens refers to is not the legal one shaped by Katz and Place and 
others. Instead it is like the Scalia-penned majority opinion, the more 
ethereal concept of privacy as we currently understand it. Much as 
Warren and Brandeis did in The Right to Privacy, Stephens is not 
referring to an existing legal concept of privacy, but a normative one, 
drawing on a conception of human dignity that is universal, or at least 
that applies to all citizens. 
D. Drones 
Drones entered the public lexicon through news about military 
and intelligence activities overseas. While talk of UAS technology still 
conjures up images of armed Predator drones, in reality most 
unmanned aircraft used domestically employ smaller, cheaper 
multiple-rotor technology. These systems have varying degrees of 
autonomy. They lack the range and power of military drones, but 
retain the ability to carry cameras and advanced imaging technology. 
Many of the contemporary concerns over UAS are new 
formulations of lingering debates over how far government can go in 
using image capture technology. Echoes of Kyllo and Ciraolo can be 
heard in questions about the purposes for which government can use 
cameras in the sky,87 though their unique capabilities such as size, 
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mobility, and flight times seem to raise the stakes.88 With these 
features, they can capture images and information in ways and from 
vantages not previously considered by lawmakers or the courts. 
The public and politicians have reacted strongly against perceived 
excesses, though the legal rationales remain murky. For example, a 
bipartisan group in Congress promised to reign in the FBI’s use of 
UAS to conduct even limited domestic surveillance.89 At the local 
level, news that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) had 
obtained drones led to protests and the creation of the Stop LAPD 
Spying Coalition, an amalgamation of privacy and civil rights 
organizations in Los Angeles, California.90 As a result of the public 
outcry, the LAPD grounded the systems until it received federal 
guidelines about where, when, and how to use them.91 The LAPD’s 
drones originally belonged to the Seattle Police Department, which 
purchased them using grant money from the Department of 
Homeland Security but sold them following public protests.92 Despite 
assurances by officials in all these cases that UAS’s would be used only 
under highly controlled circumstances, concerns over both potential 
misuse and eventual operation led to organized protests that 
grounded the aircraft. 
While the ability of government to infringe upon privacy rights is 
at the forefront of questions regarding drone use, concerns regarding 
UAS use by private parties also exist. Many have expressed concerns 
regarding Amazon’s efforts to use autonomous drones for low-weight 
package deliveries, with critics arguing that allowing the use of such 
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technologies could lead to mass surveillance.93 Phones arguably offer 
the potential for mass surveillance already, but drones inspire a 
particularly visceral reaction among the public. Since Amazon’s 
announcement, other technology giants such as Google have 
announced their own drone programs. Fears over corporate use of 
drones only intensified when, in April 2015, the FAA announced that 
it was granting Amazon’s request to test its UAS technology in the 
open skies. Permission had been granted in March for a different 
Amazon UAS technology, but the approval process had taken so long 
that the technology was obsolete.94 Privacy advocates have taken 
notice of the potential for increasing surveillance by the private sector, 
with the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filing suit 
against the FAA in April 2015 for its failure to include privacy 
provisions in its proposed rulemaking regarding commercial drone 
use.95 Other criticisms focus not so much on the camera or aviation 
technology but on the degree to which algorithms that assess and 
employ the data are hidden from view.96 The increasingly emotional 
debate between advocates of technology and the skeptical public is 
similar to other conflicts with new technology, such as genetically 
modified food.97 
The federal agency that has found itself at the center of the U.S. 
drone debate is the Federal Aviation Administration. The FAA, which 
regulates use of the nation’s airways, was charged in the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112–95) to not only 
create regulations governing the use of commercial drones in the 
United States, but also to increase the use of UAS technology and 
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ensure the protection of privacy. The agency long protested being 
given more responsibility to regulate privacy, claiming that it lacks 
sufficient expertise and capacity.98 In February 2015, the 
responsibility for the privacy-related portion of the rulemaking was 
removed by a presidential memorandum and transferred to the 
Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA).99 
Beyond shifting the responsibility for privacy regulations from the 
FAA to the NTIA, the memorandum provided insight into the 
approach the president would take to protect privacy. Naming both 
privacy and civil liberty protection as essential to federal regulation of 
drone use, the document cites the importance of the Privacy Act as a 
foundation. The Privacy Act regulates how the government collects, 
stores, and disseminates personal information, also allowing 
individuals access to and the ability to amend their personal data. 
Unfortunately, the Act has not been as successful in accomplishing 
these goals as many of its supporters would hope.100 The Presidential 
Memorandum also forbids agencies’ sharing of information collected 
by drones except when required by law or when it fulfills the 
program’s authorized purpose. This technocratic approach is meant to 
allow agencies to operate within familiar guidelines while extending 
some level of privacy protection to individuals. Privacy advocates 
supported the memorandum’s approach as a first step, but said that 
“much more needs to be done to protect our privacy.”101 
Congress has also been involved in the debate over what privacy 
protections should extend to domestic drone operations. At a hearing 
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regarding the aforementioned FBI activities, Senator Diane Feinstein 
(D-CA), the then-Chairwoman of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, declared, “I think the greatest threat to the privacy of 
Americans is the drone and the use of the drone, and the very few 
regulations that are on it today and the booming industry of 
commercial drones.”102 One measure of congressional attention is how 
many bills are introduced on a subject. In the 113th Congress (2013-
2014), 32 bills were introduced to regulate drone use by authorities 
and private parties.103 Ranging from bans on armed drones to 
requirements that officials obtain warrants before utilizing UAS 
technology, the introduced legislation reflects the broad-based 
concerns many harbor toward drone technology. At the same time, 
however, many legislators recognize the commercial and law 
enforcement potential for the technology, and have attempted to tailor 
their efforts to accommodate growth and development of the sector.104  
Some scholars argue that national legislation is necessary to 
protect privacy and prevent confusion, but in the absence of clear 
guidance, states have been unwilling to wait.105 Other scholars 
contend that states, as the primary venue for privacy law, are the 
natural place to tackle drone-related privacy concerns.106 As in the 
case of camera phones, states have used a combination of existing 
privacy statutes and new laws to tackle privacy issues. In 2014, 36 
states introduced legislation to restrict drone use, many focused on 
limiting government use, however only 15 states had passed such 
legislation (including legislation enacted in 2013) by the end of 
2014.107 While state legislatures continue to debate potential drone-
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related measures, existing statutes such as anti-wiretapping and 
“peeping tom” laws have been used to protect against private actors, 
while search and seizure laws have constrained law enforcement UAS 
use.108 Cities have also sought to tackle the drone issue with a variety 
of approaches. Some have simply passed resolutions calling for state 
or federal regulations,109 while others have considered specific 
restrictions on private or law enforcement use.110 Courts are testing 
whether existing laws, such as those covering trespassing and 
unlawful surveillance, provide adequate protection of privacy rights.111 
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III.  DRONES AND THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
The history of image capture technology shows the utility of 
technical approaches to the law. Violations of privacy using one 
technology can offer analogies to privacy violations in another. 
Cameras are ubiquitous now, but the early struggle over how to set 
limits on their use helped frame subsequent debates over camera 
phones and thermal imaging, and today they offer analogies to 
defending privacy against drone technology. History shows that some 
jurists will permit specific restrictions on technology to reduce 
demonstrable harm even when they are unwilling to interpret a 
broader dignity-based understanding of privacy. In some sense, we 
are all “Prosserian” in the American legal system—positivist 
jurisprudence is the most common contemporary legal framework.112 
Beyond the courts, history shows that legislators and regulators 
look first to narrow technical policies to protect privacy. The 
implication is that any attempt to protect privacy without 
incorporating the Prosserian tradition is likely to be impotent. 
Generalized defenses of privacy alone are an insufficient foundation 
for laws meant to restrict government from conducting certain 
activities, or for a court to find that one person has legally injured 
another. 
At the same time, the Warren and Brandeis tradition of dignity-
based privacy has proven to be a valuable resource often enough that 
it should be part of a robust defense of privacy.  
Research shows that the public’s understanding of what privacy 
entails is closer to the broad notion of a dignity-based human right to 
privacy than it is to the technical conception.113 The dignity-based 
conception of privacy ensures some democratic accountability, since it 
satisfies the intuition of a large portion of the public while not being 
strong enough on its own to stop technological development. While 
technical defenses of privacy are more limited and bound by what is 
reasonable, dignity-based conceptions of privacy assume claims about 
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self-ownership —later referred to as the right to publicity. Dignity-
based conceptions of privacy show greater potential for prevailing 
over competing rights, as in the examples from camera technology, 
and for contributing to the “visceral jolt” that Calo hopes attention to 
drones will bring to 21st century privacy law.114 
The broader, dignity-based privacy tradition also offers substantial 
resources to support one of law’s roles as a source for claims about 
first principles of right and justice.115 These principles need not be 
confined to philosophy and textbooks. For example, a judge in 2015 
dismissed all charges against a man who shot down a drone that he 
claimed was invading his privacy.116 The man shot down the drone to 
defend himself, and the judge found that the operator had no cause 
for bringing charges against someone defending his own property. 
Despite the trend toward positivism in law, drones provoke visceral 
reactions in deed and speech. Dignity-based claims remain powerful 
in part because technical approaches to law in these cases are 
unsettled. As Froomkin and Colangelo write, “Intrusion on seclusion 
is a recognized, if somewhat exotic, tort, but its rarity in the courts 
means that the scope of permissible self-help against privacy-invading 
chattels—like the camera planted by the landlord in the tenant’s 
bedroom—is poorly charted legal territory. When a privacy intrusion 
also involves a trespass, the trespass rule likely defines the scope of 
permissible self-help. But some robot-enhanced privacy intrusions 
will not involve trespass, and these are the hardest cases.”117 
Current law on the books may not adequately protect against the 
potential threats to privacy posed by rapidly advancing technology, 
leaving individuals without recourse in response to obvious moral 
wrongs. Taking a wider view of privacy can bridge the gaps left by 
narrowly crafted policies, much as Warren and Brandeis espoused 
over a century ago. The increasing ubiquity of image capture 
technology suggests that gaps will emerge at a greater rate as 
technology progresses. For example, several cases and related 
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scholarly interpretations claim that privacy harms can only occur 
when a person is present to commit the harm– a robot or drone, 
therefore, could not commit a privacy harm, the logic goes.118 A 
dignity-based argument about privacy and some technical analogies to 
other cases may help extend privacy protection in these cases. For 
example, drones have an operator just as a camera does; the principal 
difference is that the operator sits at a greater distance.  
Drawing on both of these conceptions of privacy will give privacy 
advocates the benefit of the respective virtues of each tradition. 
Dignity-based privacy is broad enough to adapt to new and unforeseen 
technological developments or novel uses. Furthermore, policy that 
draws upon dignity-based ideas of privacy are likely to elicit greater 
support from a public that understands privacy in terms of broad 
principles rather than legal technicalities. At the same time, using 
technical measures will allow policy makers to target those behaviors 
found to be most repellant and will be specific enough to reduce 
uncertainty about whether or not the behaviors are permitted. For 
instance, the Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office is 
charged with maintaining a balance between privacy and the 
department’s goals. The office is statutorily required under the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to enforce privacy-related policies, 
such as the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act, and ensure 
they are embedded into the activities of the organization. While the 
policies the DHS Privacy Office is charged with implementing are 
technical, the office claims a more normative mantle. In describing its 
mission relating to cybersecurity, the office proclaims privacy to be 
“more than just compliance with privacy laws,” invoking the values of 
public trust, transparency, and confidence in the government as 
guiding principles.119 Other government agencies may want to follow 
the same path by tying together the technical provisions they 
implement under a normative claim about the substantive goods that 
a defense of privacy serves. 
Synthesizing the approaches will not be easy in practice, however, 
as the advantages of each approach do not necessarily negate the 
weaknesses of the other, and could, in fact, exacerbate them. For 
instance, the imprecision of dignity-based approaches would be all the 
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more glaring if inelegantly wedged into technical legal provisions. 
Similarly, the addition of Prosserian language to a dignity-based 
policy could limit its utility by establishing some protections or 
violations as more important than others. As such, any attempt to 
incorporate both understandings of privacy must be done with the 
appreciation of not only the beneficial possibilities, but also the 
potential pitfalls of such efforts. 
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History and contemporary events demonstrate that as technology 
advances, there will inevitably be concerns regarding how these 
advances will impact personal privacy. Already, voices in the drone 
debate are shifting their attention from the multicopters of today to 
the insect-sized miniature drones of tomorrow. There may always be a 
tension between technological innovation and privacy concerns, 
particularly big data technologies that make even the most seemingly 
arbitrary pieces of personal information potentially valuable. 
Satisfying both the desire for innovation and the protection of privacy 
requires judges and lawmakers to identify the line between public and 
private information in context. Both Warren and Brandeis’ conception 
of dignity-based privacy and Prosser’s tort-based conception are 
resources for these debates, as each tradition offers its own 
advantages. Philosophers and the public may understand privacy as 
rooted in a broad conception of human dignity, but the law will offer 
the most certainty when privacy is buttressed by technical claims and 
protections.  
  
